CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.598
27 June 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 27 June 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Stephen J. Ledogar (United States of America)

GE.91-61525/3314B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 598th meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Poland, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Pakistan. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Mr. Gizowski.

Mr. GIZOWSKI (Poland): Mr. President, it is a great honour for me to address the Conference on Disarmament during your presidency. I should like to congratulate you on the assumption of this responsible post, fully confident that you will steer our deliberations with your well-known efficiency and skill. I also wish to thank Ambassador Solesby for her excellent work as your immediate predecessor in the Chair. I also extend our sincere words of welcome to the newly arrived heads of delegations and pledge to them our full cooperation.

As we approach the end of the second part of the 1991 session of the Conference, I should like to devote my statement today almost exclusively to the question of chemical weapons. This not only reflects the very high priority attached by my country to the earliest possible conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, but also stems from a qualitatively new situation which has emerged in this regard in the last few weeks.

Year after year the delegations, including my own, repeated in their plenary statements that the CW convention was within our reach. At that time it proved to be more an expression of hope than of a reality. Today we are facing the possibility of a genuine breakthrough in our prolonged negotiations. This is due, first of all, to the initiative undertaken by the President of the United States, which was introduced by you, Mr. President, at this forum on 16 May. My Government wholeheartedly welcomes President Bush's announcement forswearing the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, against any State. Together with the commitment of the United States to destroy unconditionally all their stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of the entry into force of the convention, it opens new promising possibilities of solving outstanding issues expeditiously and accelerating further negotiations on the convention. We highly appreciate the offer of technical assistance on safe and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons, which could greatly facilitate the smooth implementation of the convention. Altogether it provides fresh momentum towards the attainment of our ultimate goal of a world free of chemical weapons.

The positive reaction of other delegations to this initiative enabled us to reach a consensus on the necessity to accelerate the work with a view of completing the chemical weapons convention by 1992. We believe that it is the responsibility of the whole Conference on Disarmament, and not only the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, to ensure that the elaboration of the convention receives the highest priority, particularly in cases when due to limited resources in terms of availability of time or conference services there might be a need to make the necessary adjustment in consideration of various issues.

(Mr. Gizowski, Poland)

This does not mean of course that my delegation seeks to belittle the significance of other items on the agenda of the Conference. Some of those items are indeed of vital importance and should certainly stay also in the future as priority topics for negotiations in this forum. Some others, no less important from the substantive point of view, but not yet ripe as subjects for negotiating international conventions or agreements, are perhaps better suited for future discussions in other forums, such as the United Nations Disarmament Commission. But in any case, as far as the present moment is concerned, I am convinced that it is in the deepest interest of the Governments represented in this hall and the whole international community to concentrate efforts on elaborating the chemical weapons convention. Prompt, successful conclusion of the convention would add immensely to the credibility of this Conference as the unique multilateral body in the field of disarmament. And what is even more important, the conclusion of the convention, after the INF and CFE agreements and hopefully also after a START agreement, would become a step of enormous significance in building a safer world, in constructing a new infrastructure of security based not on military might but on cooperation among States.

I shall come back to the question of the chemical weapons convention later in my statement today. Now I wish to emphasize that we did notice and consider of great importance other initiatives, proposals and ideas which have been put forward in the last few months in this forum or which are directly connected with the work of the Conference on Disarmament. I have in mind first and foremost the plan for arms control and disarmament submitted by the President of France on 3 June this year. We welcome, in particular, the decision of France in principle to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and we remain convinced that it will give a strong stimulus to the process of further universalization of the Treaty.

The Conference has been addressed this year by eminent personalities from a number of countries. The statements by our distinguished guests, as well as numerous interventions by heads of delegations, have given the Conference abundant material for thinking and analysing. Several ideas have been put forward with regard to the future activities of the Conference, after the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. Particular emphasis has been placed on the question of limitation of international arms transfers. All those ideas merit careful consideration. The Polish delegation has taken note of them and will present its position in due course. As of now we can say that we regard some of the suggestions as extremely interesting and worthy of full support.

Reverting to the question of the chemical weapons convention, I cannot but fully agree with what you, Mr. President, in your capacity as the head of the United States delegation, stated when introducing President Bush's message to the Conference, namely that we cannot afford to continue with "business as usual" in our negotiations. My delegation is gratified at the fact that recently the Conference adopted several decisions conducive to the intensification and speedy conclusion of the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, including the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee and allocation of

(Mr. Cizowski, Poland)

additional time for negotiations. We are prepared to go along with any further suggestions in terms of time and effort needed to accelerate negotiations.

We believe, however, that the question of intensification is not only a problem of time but also, and perhaps in the first place, a problem of will to compromise on the part of all the participants and the necessity to give a fresh look to those issues which are blocking us from achieving the final agreement. It is our firm belief that with a real will to work intensely and to "give and take", we should be able to resolve all key outstanding issues before the end of this year.

One of these issues is undoubtedly verification. The discussion conducted on this issue so far has confirmed once again that the future verification regime should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and assurance that the convention is being observed by all parties. An effective verification system will promote the implementation of the convention by building confidence and deterring any possible violations. We all agree at least on one point - that a 100 per cent infallible verification system is just not feasible. But this does not mean that a reasonable level of assurance to the States parties that the convention is being complied with is not achievable. In principle, the basic outlines of such a system have already been written into the present "rolling text". Verification provisions dealing with chemical weapons stocks and production facilities are well elaborated and, with some refinement, they could serve properly for the effective implementation of chemical disarmament. The same is true about verifying schedule 1 facilities. There are still two major outstanding issues in the area of verification on which a solution should be found, namely the remaining part of article VI on activities not prohibited under the convention and article IX, in particular the question of inspection on request.

There is a substantial distinction between the two types of inspection. At the same time, however, both of them embody two concepts: confidence and deterrence, although the proportion among these two factors is different. While in inspection on request the deterrence factor prevails, in the case of verification activities under article VI confidence plays a leading role. This proportion is, in our opinion, quite natural. Any verification system conceived under article VI should be based on declared activities and should serve mainly as a confidence-building measure. Still, a certain degree of deterrence should be preserved. From this point of view we welcome the broadening of the scope of verification under this article. We share the opinion that it will be quite difficult to sift relevant facilities from irrelevant ones. That is why we prefer a broader approach, even risking sometimes the inclusion into the scope of declarations of facilities which are not posing a particular risk to the objectives of the convention. One might question whether any State would choose to use a declared facility for illicit weapons manufacture in the first place. The very fact that on-site inspections can take place is a significant deterrent. When making this assumption in combination with a broad scope of facilities which could be included into the declarations we are already increasing confidence substantially. Here we come

(Mr. Gizowski, Poland)

to grips with the question of how to provide adequate resources to verify treaty compliance effectively. We should be careful not to overburden the future technical secretariat with the enormous task of verifying the obvious cases and spending on this a huge amount of the Organization's budget. We were quite concerned about constantly increasing tasks of the future Organization, especially in the verification area, without being confident that this was adding to the efficiency of the implementation process. Taking this into account, certain elements in the Swedish proposal for an "integrated approach" are quite attractive to us. The crux of the matter is in the selection process. To be effective, it should combine, in our opinion, the involvement of the States parties as well as that of the technical secretariat. Our experience with the implementation of confidence-building measures in the context of the Stockholm agreement - although I am aware of differences between these two concepts - shows that when the request is treated as something normal and routine the confrontational character can be easily avoided.

The key issue in the overall verification system under the chemical weapons convention remains, however, inspection on request. We know that in spite of the fact that it is not now directly on the table this issue is not dormant. We do hope that in the rather near future it will reappear on the negotiating table. We consider inspection on request as a prerequisite for confidence that the convention is being complied with. This was one of the reasons why we undertook a trial inspection on request of Soviet military facilities located on Polish territory, a report on which will soon be presented to the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I note the presence in this plenary meeting this morning of the new representative of Romania, Ambassador Romulus Neagu, to whom I extend the warm welcome of the Conference. I apologize, Sir, that I did not note your presence before the first speaker. I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Park.

Mr. PARK (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, as this is the first time I have taken the floor in this forum, on behalf of my delegation and myself I wish to extend to you our warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to wish you every success in discharging your important responsibility. The determination that you demonstrated in your opening statement the day before yesterday to conclude the chemical-weapons-ban treaty by 1992 is a good indication of the firm leadership with which you are going to lead us to productive results of our debate on disarmament. I would also like to express our sincere appreciation to the preceding Presidents, Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, Ambassador Batsanov of the USSR and Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom, for the excellent manner in which they presided over the Conference. I also would like to take this opportunity to extend my high regards to Ambassador Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, and his staff for their invaluable assistance in making the necessary arrangements and preparations for this Conference.

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

The months of the second part of the Conference on Disarmament have been characterized by a series of events and disarmament initiatives. The European security system underwent major reforms and changes to ensure that European security keeps pace with the newly emerging international order. With its dissolution in April, the Warsaw Treaty Organization no longer exists. And the NATO Defence Ministers' meeting followed by a Foreign Ministers' meeting, convened in early June, attempted to reorient the only remaining military alliance body in Europe to better serve the peace and stability of an enlarged Europe.

The overhaul, we think, will have far-reaching implications for the future of both Europe and the world.

The CFE Treaty negotiations cleared the remaining hurdle when the Foreign Ministers of the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to resolve their key differences during their meeting in Lisbon on 1 June. The breakthrough along with the progress in the START negotiations will pave the way for the summit for the finalization of the conventional and strategic arms treaties. When the CFE Treaty is ratified, it will be another major disarmament achievement in the area of conventional weapons, and will certainly brighten prospects for the commencement of the CFE-II negotiations.

It is ironic that the world witnessed the eruption of war in the Gulf just as the warming international climate was thawing the icy remnants of cold war tensions. Was it an isolated incident or was it indicative of the uncertainty caused by multi-polarity in world politics? Whichever the case, the event revealed the volatile nature of regional conflicts and provoked serious thought on regional security and stability. If any lesson can be drawn from the experience of the Gulf war, it would be the renewed awareness of the importance of the United Nations role in these obviously uncertain times. The world body has proved itself as a focal point in bringing parties together for dialogue and collective action. New light has been shed on the potential of the United Nations Security Council in safeguarding regional peace and security and enforcing arms control.

The perils of the transfer of arms are another lesson of the Gulf war and pose additional complications for the problem of regional security. Arms transfer has been a long-standing agenda item in United Nations disarmament forums, but few workable formulas have been produced to tackle the problem, particularly with respect to tension-ridden regions. In view of the changing international political environment and the growing importance of regional security, it is necessary to take a fresh look at the ramifications of arms transfers in the regional and global arena.

In this regard, the Middle East arms control initiative proposed by President Bush of the United States on 29 May is timely and appropriate, as it envisions guidelines for halting the proliferation of conventional as well as non-conventional weapons. As the Government of the Republic of Korea has consistently supported international efforts to curb arms proliferation, we welcome the initiative and wish to express our hope that it will help to consolidate the region's peace and security with the cooperation of the

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

countries involved. An equally important arms control initiative in a much broader context is the arms control and disarmament plan put forward by President Mitterrand of France on 3 June. The French initiative, among other things, underlines the role and responsibility of the United Nations as an important factor in combating the problem of arms proliferation. As elaborated by the proposal, the reduction of tensions and the removal of sources of conflict are of primary importance. Such efforts combined with enhancement of transparency and confidence-building are essential in the arms control process. In our view, the two proposals of the United States and France are mutually supportive and complementary, and, therefore, a good starting-point in the pursuit of a generally applicable formula.

Thanks to the exhaustive review that has been made of the effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, more time has been allocated to negotiation - the substantive part of the CD's functioning - with the change in the schedule of the annual session and the reduction in the overall number of plenary meetings. Pertinent to this line of innovative restructuring is the issue of the extension of CD membership. In spite of the collapse of the cold war that has done away with the East-West dichotomy, disarmament continues to be one of the utmost challenges confronting the world. The increasing number of aspirants to full CD membership is a clear reflection of concerns on disarmament. In this regard, equitable geographical distribution as well as military significance are, inter alia, the factors to be taken into account. In keeping with the changing international realities, careful consideration should continue to be given to keeping the CD's organization and work up to date.

The draft convention on the chemical weapons ban is one of the most crucial and promising items on the Conference's agenda and has raised hopes and expectations for the early conclusion of the convention. In our view, the key to the success of the convention on chemical weapons lies in assuring universal adherence to the convention. We share the view of other delegations that universal adherence could best be ensured by making the convention effective, non-discriminatory and verifiable. To this end, we wish to underline the importance of ironing out the remaining differences for the establishment of an effective verification regime. Such a regime would enhance confidence in the convention by assuring each State party that other States parties remain in full compliance.

President Bush of the United States made an announcement on 13 May on the United States unconditional commitment to the destruction of all of its stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of the convention coming into force. President Bush's new arms control initiative is most welcome and represents a positive and far-sighted step toward achieving universal adherence to the chemical weapons convention.

The outbreak of chemical warfare was an ominous possibility during the Gulf war, and the world was alerted to its potentially catastrophic consequences. Despite progress made in disarmament negotiations between the two super Powers and in Europe, and the recent conclusion of the Gulf war, the danger of chemical weapons use has not completely disappeared. The time is

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

ripe to take advantage of every possible opportunity to broaden support for the early and successful conclusion of the convention, in the same way that momentum was created by the Paris Ministerial Conference and the Canberra Government-Industry Conference in 1989.

The convention on banning chemical weapons and the Convention prohibiting biological weapons are twin branches of the same tree. The third review conference of the biological weapons Convention will be held in September in Geneva. The Republic of Korea has always supported international efforts to eradicate weapons of mass destruction. My country, as a party to the Convention since 1987, will be represented at the review conference and will make an active contribution to making the Convention effective and lasting.

The fourth review conference of the NPT, held in Geneva in August-September last year, and the amendment conference of the partial test-ban Treaty, convened in New York in early January this year, were the two major events highlighting the serious differences among the States parties over the issue of a complete test ban. The linkage approach to a CTB at the fourth review conference of the NPT yielded no concrete results, left the future of the NPT after 1995 uncertain and made the other important agreements superfluous. We are hopeful, however, that this does not represent a total setback, but a temporary one before a leap forward towards a universal NPT. We welcome France's decision announced on 3 June to join the NPT. France's accession to the NPT will strengthen the authority of the Treaty and reinforce worldwide pressure to bring those countries outside of the Treaty into the non-proliferation regime.

The unsafeguarded nuclear facilities of the States parties to the NPT, particularly North Korea, reportedly possessing significant nuclear facilities, have been the subject of international concern. In international forums such as the IAEA and NPT conferences, a great number of States parties, both individually and collectively, have called for the early and speedy conclusion by such countries of safeguards agreements with IAEA.

The Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, hosted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Pyongyan in April-May, neither alleviated nor diminished worldwide apprehension over the unsafeguarded nuclear programmes of the States parties. IPU attempted to remedy the situation by adopting a resolution urging these States parties to subject their nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. Very recently, it was revealed that IAEA has been informed by North Korea of the latter's intention to resume negotiations on a safeguards agreement with IAEA in July, with a view to submitting the agreement to the IAEA Board of Governors for approval at its September session. If the Democratic People's Republic of Korea indeed proves its intention through concrete action, as laid down in article 3 of the NPT and other relevant regulations of IAEA, and with no conditions attached, it will be the first major step for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in easing the worldwide suspicion hanging over its reportedly significant nuclear facilities.

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

The signing of a safeguards agreement with IAEA is an unqualified, mandatory obligation of the States parties to the NPT. The conditions attached by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to submission to IAEA inspection cannot be justified by any means. As the unsafeguarded nuclear programmes of States parties represent a serious threat to regional and international peace and security, efforts should be intensified for the realization of their full-fledged commitment to an IAEA safeguards agreement at the earliest date.

In his address at the forty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1988, President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea proposed a consultative conference for peace in north-east Asia in order to lay a solid foundation for durable peace and prosperity in the region. The proposal was made in an effort to create a favourable international environment more conducive to peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula within the framework of regional security in north-east Asia. It is particularly to be noted that the necessity of convening such forums has also been felt by other countries with their subsequent proposals in a similar vein.

These days the Korean peninsula has often been described as the last remaining arena of cold war confrontation. Fortunately, it now appears inevitable that North-South relations will thaw under the continuing warmth of the international political climate. By virtue of our efforts to improve relations with those countries whose ideologies and political systems acted as hindrances in the past, the political climate surrounding the Korean peninsula has steadily improved and has become increasingly conducive to stability and peace in the area. On 28 May, North Korea announced its decision to apply for United Nations membership, which we wholeheartedly welcomed. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's acceptance of two separate United Nations memberships for North and South Korea opens the way for peaceful co-existence between the two parts of Korea and for normalization of inter-Korean relations pending the reunification of the country. The admission of both South and North Korea to the United Nations will help lay to rest the long-standing confrontation and enmity between the two sides and to promote dialogue and exchanges as responsible and peace-loving members of the international community.

The Prime Ministers of South and North Korea last year held three rounds of talks alternately in Seoul and Pyongyang, until they were suspended in January this year. Because of the deep-rooted mistrust and suspicion between the two parts of Korea born out of a long-drawn-out military confrontation, mutual opening, exchanges and cooperation are essential as a confidence-building process before any meaningful dialogue on matters of disarmament and arms control can commence. We have learned from Europe's experience that mutual openness and transparency are the basis for any disarmament talks.

There have been limited inter-Korean exchanges in the areas of performing arts and sports, giving rise to high expectations for future exchanges and confidence-building exercises in other areas. It is encouraging that some of our CBM proposals are also referred to in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's recent proposal on arms control on the Korean peninsular - namely,

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

peaceful use of the Demilitarized Zone, installation of direct hot lines between the military authorities and advance notification of military exercises. With regard to the peaceful use of the Demilitarized Zone, in particular, I would like to recall that President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea in his address at the forty-third United Nations General Assembly proposed an idea of building a "city of peace" in the DMZ, where separated families could freely reunite, and broad trade and other kinds of exchanges could be facilitated.

We are more hopeful than before that, given the forthcoming United Nations membership of both North and South Korea, the suspended South-North Prime Ministers' talks will be resumed soon so that we can re-open dialogue on these vital confidence-building measures and other arms control issues and contribute to the disarmament process at the regional and global level.

As a responsible member of the international community, the Republic of Korea will spare no effort to help facilitate the implementation of the noble task of this Conference. Finally, in concluding, allow me to express the fervent wish of the Korean Government that the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, will make a positive contribution to the promotion of world peace and security by successfully concluding the chemical weapons convention as early as possible, and that a breakthrough on other major issues of the CD, such as the nuclear test ban, will be made in the near future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rasaputram.

Mr. RASAPUTRAM (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, let me at the very outset congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency. I am particularly pleased to do so as you represent a country with which Sri Lanka has traditionally close and friendly relations. Your diplomatic skills and initiative are well known and we are confident of a most successful conduct of the CD's business under your able guidance. I would also like to express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessor Ambassador Tessa Solesby of the United Kingdom who guided our work most efficiently and with great acceptance. May I also take this opportunity to join in extending a warm welcome to the newly arrived heads of delegations? We will greatly miss the company and contributions of Ambassador Nabil Elaraby of Egypt but would like to congratulate him for his new appointment and wish him well.

My statement today will focus on our negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. My delegation will revert to other priority items on our agenda and the question of the improved and effective functioning of the CD at a later stage. On the important question of the improved and effective functioning, my delegation hopes that the very useful exchange of views will continue under the able guidance of Ambassador Kamal.

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

In our statement at the last session of the CD we expressed optimism that a comprehensive and global ban on chemical weapons was within reach. Recent developments have enhanced this optimism. We indeed believe that the CW negotiations have now entered a decisive, and hopefully, the terminal phase. We also stated then that the bulk of the "technical infrastructure" of the convention was in place and that remaining issues should be addressed in a political perspective with a view to taking decisions through compromises. We now feel that the negotiations are poised to move in that direction.

We welcome in this context the initiative by the President of the United States in announcing a most constructive change of position facilitating a consensus on the main prohibition of the convention covering the entire chemical weapons cycle including the unconditional destruction of CW stocks within the specified time-frame. We take satisfaction at the fact that this development has already led to the emergence of a consensus on article I of the Convention. The comprehensive character of the main prohibition that we now have, which is applicable in any circumstances whatsoever, will augur well for achieving the desired objective of universality. We hope that somewhat related issue of article XII will be resolved expeditiously. As my delegation sees it, the remaining issue relating to article XII involves both legal and political questions. Given the comprehensive and multilateral nature of the convention that we all hope for, it is important that we adopt innovative solutions to such problems. In this regard, the interesting idea put forward by the distinguished Ambassador of Austria is worthy of serious consideration by countries which have entered reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The possibility of a collective withdrawal of reservations would be an expression of greater political support for the kind of comprehensive regime envisaged under the convention. It would also amount to an important confidence-building measure, commensurate with the unconditional prohibition which we have already secured collectively.

A consensus having been reached in the Conference for an intensified work programme, for which we would like to thank Ambassador Batsanov, it is now important for the Committee to maintain the momentum of its work. We therefore hope that new substantive proposals aiming at developing a consensus acceptable to all delegations will be forthcoming on remaining major issues such as inspection on request. My delegation shares the view that the procedure for inspections on request is an important part of the verification regime to maintain the confidence of all countries, large and small, developed and developing. We also believe that in order to achieve this desired objective, the concept itself should retain its multilateral character and be depoliticized. Its intrusiveness and use should be managed in a way consistent with the objectives and the scope of the Convention. The new inputs expected, we hope, will address these aspects and lead to consensus.

In our statement to the CD on 22 March last year, my delegation referred to two aspects of a possible framework to facilitate solutions to remaining political questions. One was the desirability of a time-frame to conclude our negotiations and the other was the question whether we should look at a package format to handle remaining issues in the terminal phase of our negotiations. My delegation stated then:

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

"We are inclined to believe that a time-frame for the conclusion of the convention could now be considered as a via media for seeking solutions to remaining issues. The questions relating to scope, the composition and decision-making of the Executive Council, challenge inspection, assistance, the order of destruction, economic and technological development and the Convention's relationship to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are issues which require political decisions in a spirit of compromise, bearing in mind the realities of desired universality. One could argue that these issues are politically interrelated in a manner that perhaps requires solutions in a package form during the terminal phase of negotiations."

We therefore take satisfaction at the fact that a consensus was achieved to infuse a sense of timing into the mandate of the Committee. In order to use the other aspect of a package framework we encourage the Chairman of the Committee to pursue his own consultations.

All are agreed that universality is the desired objective with regard to the implementation of the Convention. As has been pointed out by the Group of 21, a key to achieve this objective would be the internal consistency of the convention in maintaining the non-discriminatory and multilateral character of the treaty which now embodies a comprehensive and unconditional ban on the entire chemical weapons cycle. Consistency of these two principles should be equally applicable to the composition and decision-making process of the Executive Council.

Long-drawn-out efforts, both bilateral and multilateral, have contributed to developing the "rolling text" as it stands today. The authority of the consensus flowing from the Paris Conference and recent developments facilitating a consensus on the main prohibition augur well for the Committee to come to grips with other political issues, while parallel technical work should continue in working groups. Sri Lanka remains committed to the conclusion of the convention at the earliest possible date. I have been instructed by my Government to state that it is actively considering becoming an original signatory to the convention, when it is ready for signature upon conclusion.

The chemical weapons convention will be a unique instrument in terms of both its intrusiveness and its coverage of civilian industrial activity. It could also be the first international instrument which envisages, in one way or another, the concept of universality even before the conclusion of negotiations. While extra-convention means will always be available to promote universality, the most effective way of ensuring the widest possible participation would be to promote universality from within the text of the convention. The majority of the potential States parties will be countries which have never had chemical weapons and have no intention of acquiring them. It is therefore important that the convention does not entail undue and disproportionate institutional and financial burdens on such countries under the verification regime envisaged. As was pointed out by the distinguished Minister of New Zealand, it will be essential that the verification burdens of the convention should not discourage smaller countries from acceding. One

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

cannot argue that the accession of militarily insignificant countries, which would in any case not pose a threat to the convention, is of less significance than a "capable" country remaining outside the convention.

It is in this context that my delegation would like to commend for serious consideration the pertinent observations of the delegation of Argentina concerning the need for the verification regime to remain commercially neutral and the importance of avoiding a dual regime for civil chemical trade once the convention enters into force. Developing countries which seek to develop their, as yet, elementary civilian chemical industry will have to weigh the security benefits of the convention against the costs and burdens not only of national implementation measures and international verification measures but also of the economic implications of possible dual regimes. The justified motives of devising an adequately comprehensive verification regime should not take us to the extreme of legislating for every eventuality. This would overburden the convention with an expensive verification regime that could go beyond the scope of the convention. Financing of such a regime can entail considerable financial obligations for developing countries. It will therefore be of importance to agree on a viable balance of verification burdens, bearing in mind that letter-perfect verification is neither feasible nor needed.

We feel that the opportunity now exists for the CD to strive towards firming up what could be the Conference's first conclusive output, since its inception over a decade ago. The consensus that was recently achieved on article I was the culmination of a long process. It also demonstrated the dynamism of multilateral negotiations and the fact that debilitating attributes sometimes conferred upon multilateral bodies are not justified. In fact the consensus on article I proved the contrary. The initial draft text of a CW convention submitted to the CD some years ago was enriched and developed in a dynamic way by multilateral participation. The very basis of the new consensus, namely, the idea of including the use of CW in the main prohibition, did not figure in the initial proposal but was conceived and developed by this multilateral body. The CD has therefore proved that it can negotiate, even on issues concerning weapons of mass destruction, if and when it is enabled to do so. Among the many tragedies and ironies of the Gulf war, some would perceive a realization that the threat of mass destruction deriving from chemical weapons neither deterred war nor influenced the outcome of that war. If this is to be one among many lessons to be drawn from that tragic event, it is perhaps time for the CD to pay more focused attention to other priority items on our agenda dealing with a host of disarmament questions including the priority nuclear issues which have remained in a state of paralysis due to similar doctrinal considerations. Irrespective of the moral of the Gulf conflict experience, if it has presented us with an opportunity to eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass destruction, the CD has to seize that opportunity.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Rahardjo.

Mr. RAHARDJO (Indonesia): As I am speaking for the first time in the plenary session of this august body, allow me to warmly congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference. My delegation is confident that with your wisdom and customary aplomb doubled with long and vast experience, you will be able to discharge your task effectively and efficiently. Allow me also to extend my felicitations, through you, to Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom, who preceded you in the Chair, for the efficient and tactful manner in which she presided over our deliberations. On behalf of Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia, who had to leave the Conference very suddenly last April, I wish to extend his sincere thanks to all colleagues and friends at the Conference, as well as the members of the secretariat, for the cooperation rendered to him during his term as head of the Indonesian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament. He also requested me, on this occasion, to wish every success to all of the distinguished personalities taking part in this gathering, the delegates of both the members and the observer States, and all members of the secretariat. Through you, Mr. President, I also wish to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues and ambassadors who have joined us since the start of this second session of the Conference.

My association with the Conference on Disarmament is at a time when the echo of the ongoing dynamic and fundamental changes in the global political climate seems to be having an effect on its work. The observations made on the progress of the negotiations on item 4 have made it clear to us all that tangible results could be realized in the near future, due to the conciliatory positions of the major parties, which will eventually pave the way for the speedy conclusion of the draft convention.

It is my delegation's view that a decision made by the major possessors of chemical weapons to abandon these weapons options and to totally eliminate them from their military arsenals would encourage others to do the same. Recent events in the Gulf have clearly demonstrated that the military value of these weapons is limited when in contest with other systems of sophisticated weaponry owned by a handful of the collective military Powers. The political costs of maintaining these abhorrent weapons for defence and military purposes in the future will be too high for any country to afford.

The change of position of the Government of the United States on the question of the use of chemical weapons has provided new impetus to the course of negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The new approach of the Governments of the United States and the USSR to the question of universal adherence has brought about a fresh resolve and has resulted in the emergence of a common will to achieve a final agreement as soon as possible on the establishment of a treaty on the total prohibition of these abhorrent weapons. My delegation welcomes this development and hopes that the future convention on chemical weapons will be a faithful reflection of the legitimate interests of the international community as a whole.

For a country like Indonesia, which has never possessed or developed such abhorrent weapons, the total prohibition of their use has always been regarded as a crucial element in the convention. We believe that the real danger of

(Mr. Rahardjo, Indonesia)

chemical weapons lies in the possible use or threat of use of these weapons, rather than the development or stockpiling of these weapons. In this context, the importance of provisions regulating assistance and protection in case of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons could well be emphasized in order to create a deterrent and thus lessen the chance of countries choosing chemical weapons for aggressive military purposes. My delegation also attaches particular importance to the provision governing the future possibility of the use or threat of use of such weapons by States which are not party to the convention. A provision which assures prompt assistance and protection to a State party which might be threatened or attacked by any State using chemical weapons may attract States to become party to the convention.

In the course of the negotiations of the last few years, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has not been able to reach agreement on the above question, which is due among other reasons to the thorny question of the threat of use of chemical weapons. Moreover, the question of the function of the future technical secretariat in providing assistance to States parties in need of assistance in case of the threat of use or use of chemical weapons has remained unresolved. If these pending questions are to be resolved, a new approach has to be developed. Any State or States parties to the convention which renounce chemical weapons options for their defence purposes and become parties to the convention should be entitled to receive assistance or protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, with a view to preventing the real use of such weapons against this particular State or States parties. My delegation hopes that those which are in a position to do so will make a contribution either in cash, or in kind, through the assistance mechanism to be created under the auspices of the technical secretariat. At the same time efforts should also be pursued to make the technical secretariat function effectively so as to enable it to give prompt assistance to countries in need.

With regard to the interrelationship between the future chemical weapons convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, my delegation would like to emphasize that the provision governing such a relationship should be carefully and properly drafted so as to fully reflect the concerns and aspirations of the States parties to the convention. The future chemical weapons convention should avoid any possible confusion or loopholes which may lead to abuse by any State which is party to both the future convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

While it is encouraging to note the wealth of ideas which have been put forward during the course of the negotiations on the convention on chemical weapons, my delegation considers it necessary to mention a number of points which are of relevance to us. With reference to the verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry, we are all aware that a new concept based on an integrated approach has been introduced. This has altered the perceived concept of verification as envisaged in the "rolling text" of the last session of the Conference on Disarmament; among others the range of the target to be verified has been widened. The concept of "capable" facilities allows on-site inspection not only in those facilities which produce but also those which are able to produce or process scheduled

(Mr. Rahardjo, Indonesia)

chemicals. In this connection we would like to underline that the question of verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry should be approached cautiously with a view to avoiding an unnecessary burden upon the developing countries which are still in the process of developing their chemical industry.

With reference to the effective functioning of the verification system of the convention, the Indonesian delegation welcomes the conduct of the meeting of the Technical Group on Instrumentation. Based on the experience gained from our participation in the meeting, it was learnt that the existing laboratories and research institutes in Indonesia are operating the same instrumentation as conceived to be used in the future verification system. As for the need to furnish inspectors for the future implementation of the verification system of the convention, I wish to express the appreciation of the Indonesian Government to the Government of Finland for granting the opportunity for Indonesian officials to participate in the training course for such inspectors. We earnestly hope that this initiative will be followed by other countries which are in a position to do so, with a view to improving the technical skills of the personnel for the smooth implementation of the convention.

While recognizing the importance of the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical weapons, we should not lose sight of the need to pursue the efforts towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, which is long overdue. It has been noted that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has resumed its work. We recognize that the progress of the work in the Committee in stemming further qualitative improvements of nuclear weaponry falls far short of expectations. There is still a tremendous amount of work ahead of us in order to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban regime which will be universally adhered to. The resumption of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee is expected to be a good beginning. We hope that its endeavours will be instrumental in the overall effort to establish a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

During the PTBT Treaty Amendment Conference some constructive ideas were outlined. It was suggested inter alia by some that the verification proposals, namely the draft protocol presented to the Amendment Conference by the co-sponsor of the Conference, should be transmitted to the Conference on Disarmament for further consideration. My delegation is pleased to learn that the draft protocol regarding the verification of a nuclear test-ban treaty submitted by the co-sponsor of the PTBT Amendment Conference has been taken up by the Ad Hoc Committee. We hope that its result will contribute to the overall endeavours directed toward the establishment of a CTBT. As exemplified by a large number of United Nations General Assembly resolutions on a CTBT, and a clear mandate to the Conference as stipulated in the Final Document of SSOD-I, my delegation shares the view that a mandate to negotiate should be given to the Ad Hoc Committee in order to make the Committee work more effectively.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I would be grateful if he could trans-it our appreciation to Ambassador Loeis for his message to us. My predecessor has already expressed best wishes to him on his departure, and I should like now to join her in wishing the Ambassador best wishes in his new assignment. I now give the floor to our next speaker, the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Mr. President, let me begin by expressing our happiness at seeing you in the Chair, the representative of a country with which Pakistan has always enjoyed a close relationship. We are confident that under your direction the work of the CD will be conducted efficiently and skilfully. On my part, I would like to assure you that you will receive the full cooperation of my delegation in the fulfilment of your task. A number of colleagues have left since I last took the floor. I would like to take this opportunity to wish them every success in their future endeavours. I would also like to extend a very warm welcome to new colleagues who have joined us recently.

Our annual session last year began on a positive note. Speaker after speaker highlighted the political changes that were taking place in Europe, and welcomed the growing spirit of dialogue and understanding that was marking the relationship between the super-Powers. There was well-founded optimism that worldwide disarmament had become an achievable objective. But all these hopes and expectations crumbled with the developments in the Persian Gulf. We were confronted with the stark reality of an end to the cold war that may have led to a more cooperative relationship between the super-Powers, but which did not imply the beginning of universal peace, nor signal a new international stability. We still appear to be a long way off from our goal of general and complete disarmament under effective internatioanl control. While the cold war infected almost all other conflicts on the globe, most of these conflicts clearly existed in their own right, and would continue to rage until each found its own solution. Many of these conflicts had the potential to involve States outside their respective regions, as was demonstrated by the Gulf war itself. We therefore believe that a regional approach to disarmament, which leads to the elimination of conflicts and the removal of tensions from various regions of the world, would reinforce the structure of world peace and security to which we are all committed.

It is gratifying to note that this regional approach to disarmament is steadily gaining ground. The importance of this concept was clearly demonstrated with the inclusion of the item "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security" in this year's agenda of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. We have actively participated in the discussions on this agenda item, and hope that the promise evident in the discussions of this year will be translated into concrete proposals by the time the report is finalized at the 1993 session of UNDC. We also hope that these developments will be duly reflected in our own agenda in the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

On a more concrete level, there is a growing recognition also that the security problems and preoccupations of States can be accorded fuller consideration in a regional context, where remedial measures can be designed which are suitable to specific situations. The success of the CSCE process in Europe bears testimony to the idea that regional consultations offer an important and relevant answer to the problems of security and arms control. If disarmament on a regional scale can succeed in a Europe which is the cradle of the cold war, then there is no reason why it cannot be pursued in other parts of the world with the same degree of success. This does not mean that the successful application of certain measures in one region can merely be transplanted into another region. It is evident that each region has distinct characteristics, but it is possible to learn from the experience of other regions, and to translate and imbibe the principles of their success with appropriate modifications.

In our own region, South Asia, we have, for many years, been promoting regional and bilateral efforts aimed at ensuring the equal and undiminished security of all States. These efforts have been supplemented by our strong belief in the utility and importance of confidence-building measures for the maintenance of regional peace and security, and for developing mutually beneficial and friendly relations among States. Even though confidence-building measures alone cannot provide a guarantee of progress towards the resolution of major disputes, they must be pursued earnestly, in order to avoid at least those crises that can result from misperceptions or lack of transparency, particularly in the military sphere. In this context, I would like to draw attention to the recent agreements concluded between Pakistan and India on advance notice of military exercises, manoeuvres and troop movements, prevention of air space violations and permitting overflights and landings of military aircraft. An agreement between Pakistan and India on the prohibition of attacks on each other's nuclear facilities, ratified earlier this year, also constitutes a significant confidence-building measure between the two countries.

Important as these measures are, they are far from being the only initiatives in our troubled region. At a time when renewed attention is being focused on the dangers of nuclear proliferation, allow me to list yet again some of the proposals initiated by Pakistan over the past two decades. In 1974, when India exploded a nuclear device, we proposed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, a proposal which has been repeatedly endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly ever since. In 1978, we proposed that, as a first step, India and Pakistan should issue a joint declaration renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons. In 1979, we proposed an agreement with India on a system of bilateral inspection of all nuclear facilities on a reciprocal basis. In 1979 again, we proposed simultaneous acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards by India and Pakistan on all nuclear facilities. The same year we also expressed our readiness to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, simultaneously with India. In 1987, we proposed the conclusion of a bilateral or regional nuclear test-ban treaty. The same year again, we also proposed the convening of an

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

international conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of regional and other States.

Now, on 6 June 1991, the Prime Minister of Pakistan has specifically proposed that the United States, the Soviet Union and China consult and meet with India and Pakistan to discuss and resolve the issue of nuclear proliferation in South Asia, on the basis of proposals already made, or any new ideas that may emerge. A regional non-proliferation regime, containing guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States, and agreed to by all the regional countries, would help resolve the problem in all its dimensions, and usher in a climate of mutual trust, peace and security in South Asia, enabling the States of the region to concentrate their energies and efforts on accelerating economic development, and on the promotion of the well-being of their peoples.

Of late, increasing references have been made to the creation of a new world order, a concept which recognizes that arms proliferation was one of the major underlying causes of regional instability, and which has made it one of its central concerns. It proposes substantial arms control measures, and stresses the need for responsible behaviour by both arms recipients and suppliers in an effort to prevent dangerous regional imbalances from emerging. We have no philosophical dispute with this concept and would be glad to see it succeed. We hope, however, that the measures that have been suggested will be applied across the board, without discrimination, and that they will not legitimize or perpetuate existing regional imbalances. Many small and medium-sized States, lacking indigenous defence production capabilities, have no choice but to rely upon arms purchases from abroad to meet their essential security needs. Unless the basic causes of insecurity are eliminated from inter-State relations, nations will not be persuaded to stop acquiring arms. Arms control thus has to be pursued as a political process aimed at ensuring equal and undiminished security for all regional States at the lowest levels of armaments. We must, therefore, guard against any attempt to isolate and highlight only one element of conventional arms control, while ignoring its other important aspects.

To sum up, regional disarmament is an area which deserves much greater attention than it has received so far. We remain convinced that the successful application of this concept would contribute immensely to international peace and security. The world is, after all, composed of the sum of its parts, and if we can achieve disarmament on a regional level, then we can transform this mosaic of insecure regions into a planet of global prosperity and universal peace.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. That concludes my prescribed list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): My delegation is pleased to see that the second session of the Conference on Disarmament is concluding with a new atmosphere which all of us like very much.

The Peace and Anti-nuclear Committee of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea two days ago made a detailed public statement on the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula, and the Committee made it clear about the threat of those nuclear weapons. I think all of us are well aware of what I mean. Nuclear weapons have been deployed on the Korean peninsula since 1957. Since then, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been under threat from nuclear weapons for nearly 30 years. Under this menace the Democratic People's Republic of Korea decided to be protected by international law, namely the NPT, so we joined the NPT in 1985. We expected an improvement in the situation on the Korean peninsula, but we witnessed only the increase of nuclear arsenals in South Korea and the continued, ceaseless, military manoeuvres. These manoeuvres comprised 200,000 military forces from the United States in South Korea. These exercises inform the world that these are exercises for nuclear war. Therefore, the Korean people strongly demanded the withdrawal of these nuclear weapons from South Korea and appeal to the world to join us in achieving these efforts. We had hoped that the South Korean authorities would join us to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-weapon-free zone which we proposed to discuss, but they opposed it. Now, they did not utter about these nuclear weapons and the nuclear war threat caused by the southern part of the Korean peninsula. I want to ask them: Didn't they know about these realities? Didn't they see the danger of these nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea? More than 1,000 nuclear weapons of all kinds. Didn't they know that voices are sounded by the South Korean people as well as among the American people to withdraw? It is time to withdraw from the last point of the cold war. But now, I hear no sign from the South Korean side to make the Korean peninsula a peaceful and nuclear-free-zone. They talk nonsense. This is not only a threat to the Korean people; it threatens the security and peace of Asia as a whole. No one can imagine what will happen if these kinds of weapon explode in the region. It could easily be spread to other regions. So, if the South Korean authorities really want peace and security and harmony among Koreans, they should join us to withdraw the foreign nuclear weapons from our own soil. Of course, my delegation plans to make a statement in the future. We have a schedule, therefore I don't want to make other comments on Korean questions and bilateral problems and relations between North and South. We must speak about this when we have a chance to speak. today, I reserve my right to speak about all those questions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement. Is there any other representative who wishes to take the floor at this time? I see none and would therefore turn to other matters. The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies

(The President)

will not then be in session. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and can be changed if the need arises. It seems good practice, however, to advance our work by indicating what we will be doing at the opening of the next part of the annual session. Therefore, I would like to invite you to adopt the timetable which you have there if, of course, there is no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the timetable for this week, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", immediately after this plenary meeting. I have no other business for today. I shall now adjourn the 598th plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held four weeks from today, on Thursday, 25 July, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.